strain of extended conflict against Athens and its allies led to reduced resources while extending Sparta's commitments across the Greek world. The direct threat from Athens fixed the majority of Sparta's army at home to secure against invasion, maritime raids, or slave revolts. Athens avoided direct conflict with Sparta's armies, and instead conducted an asymmetric campaign that relied upon its superior navy to conduct raids against Sparta's exposed coastline, or achieve a local superiority in arms to conquer Sparta's isolated allies. Sparta was forced to rely upon the competence, professionalism, and skill of its commanders to develop and employ the capacity and unique capabilities of its allies to counter these Athenian stratagems. As exemplified by Gylippus, the Spartans achieved a significant victory against the Athenians by successfully integrating their small, capable force with their Sicilian allies to build and expand upon those alliances. Gylippus' leadership and tactical acumen significantly influenced the confidence of his allies, and the successful execution of joint operations.
His leadership and vision provided the decisive impetus behind the development of allied capacity as exemplified by the Syracusan navy.
Gylippus was a superior combined, joint commander who arrived at the right time and at the right place at small expense to his homeland to achieve decisive results by, with, and through the capacity of his allies. The Spartan system produced an officer and an army with the right combination of leadership skills and tactical competencies that when combined with a policy of strategic engagement in the Greek world was capable of critical, disproportionate results. Gylippus was empowered by Sparta to develop the situation, and take the initiative to act decisively in Sicily. This Spartan commander personifies the philosophy of mission command enshrined in U.S. Army 3 doctrine; he gained the trust and confidence of his subordinates and his allies, and provided a common vision to the unified force on how to achieve success. Within a climate of trust in this unified force, he and his allied commanders developed innovative solutions and accepted prudent risk to "create opportunities rather than simply preventing defeat." 8 The 
Mission Command and a Partnering Culture
Mission command doctrine provides the U.S. Army with a philosophy for operating in an uncertain environment, and recognizes that Army leaders command not only Army forces, but also work with and influence diverse unified partners. 9 Additionally, this philosophy addresses the strategic imperatives Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta outlined within the context of "Building Partnerships in the 21st Century"
guidance that requires the U.S. Army to train, advise, and partner with foreign military and security forces to build their capacity as a means to address security challenges of 4 the future, and to sustain a peaceful and cooperative international order. 10 Mission command is the vision of the leadership culture of the future Joint Force 2020, and its implementation requires the development of adaptable leaders at every echelon who can function effectively in a dynamic security environment, and in an era of fiscal constraint. 11 Within the framework of these future challenges and the transition to Joint
Force 2020, the U.S. Army must take concrete measures to eliminate toxic leadership, reform training management, and transform leader development to create a climate of trust that enables mission command and a partnering culture.
Pursuing comprehensive engagement is a critical component of the strategic approach outlined in the latest National Security Strategy. This strategy links America's national security to its allies, and requires active engagement to develop partnerships to address global and regional security priorities. Inherent in this approach is the obligation for the U.S. military to strengthen its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments. 12 Nested with this approach is the Department of Defense concept of "Building Partnerships in the 21 st Century". The purpose of this initiative is to focus and improve upon comprehensive security cooperation to build the capacity of partners and allies, and enable them to collaborate with the United States to meet the security challenges of the future. 13 This initiative describes a smaller U.S.
force similar to the one led by the Spartan Gylippus, conducting innovative, smallfootprint rotational deployments throughout the world, and capable of tremendous influence through combined exercises, training, and assistance to allies and partners. International Development (USAID), and non-governmental organizations to help partnered countries modernize and reform to contribute to regional security. 16 This indicates that a key component of this initiative is also a collaborative inter-agency partnership. Creating such a partnership allows for a higher level of mutual understanding and synchronization to establish a whole of government approach to shape the security environment.
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The partnering culture envisioned by this policy and nested with the National Security Strategy has wide-ranging implications for the development and education of
Army officers who will plan and execute security force assistance operations around the world. This paper addresses these implications, and integrates them into the wider context of a comprehensive proposal to reform training management, commander selection, and leader development. Also inherent in this policy is the concept of decentralized operations conducted within a given GCC by junior leaders and small units to achieve these desired effects. There is a correlation between the level of trust granted to subordinate units by their commanders and the level of influence that a geographically aligned BCT can achieve in support of security force assistance operations. The more distributed their operations, the greater the influence.
General Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), describes an increasingly complex, dynamic, and uncertain operating environment where smaller, lighter forces will conduct decentralized operations at the tactical level with operational/strategic implications. 17 This approach requires uniquely capable Army leaders, Soldiers, and units who can successfully establish credibility and earn the trust and confidence of partners and allies to train, advise, and fight shoulder to shoulder with them. Again, the example of Gylippus during the Peloponnesian Wars elucidates this point. Sparta's allies in Sicily trusted Gylippus implicitly; they derived their trust and confidence in him from his competence as a commander, and the competence of his Spartan soldiers. His ability to achieve decisive results was not possible without internal and external trust; the internal trust that was inherent within the Spartan army itself, and the external trust that existed between Gylippus, his government, and his allies. Like the example of Gylippus, mission command is the leadership philosophy that will allow the U.S. Army to operate successfully in the future security environment, and achieve a partnering culture. However, mission command is contingent upon a climate of trust to function properly and thrive.
Spectrum of Options
This paper presents a spectrum of options to achieve a climate of trust and a partnering culture that enables the Army's leadership philosophy of mission command.
Toxic leadership is a primary obstacle to mission command, and the integration of the This paper also presents a series of recommendations to achieve the right balance across the doctrinal leadership development domains to optimize talent and create the trust and competence that are the requisite conditions of mission command 8 and a partnering culture. The success of mission command is dependent on the talent of its commanders, and commanders play the critical role in the leader development that instills mission command in the Army. Therefore, this paper proposes that the Army focus on a selection process that chooses officers with a talent for command.
Commander selection starting at the battalion level is the critical talent management gate, and requires a process with adequate contextual data to evaluate an officer's talent for command. This reinforces the argument to implement the MSAF 360 leadership assessment into the officer evaluation and board process as a means to provide this context. Additionally, the implementation of these assessments into the command selection process creates the basis for a holistic judgment of merit that will inspire trust across the Army. Selecting officers with a talent for command translates into renewed focus on leadership development that will foster talent in junior leaders, and will provide a positive experience to inspire the retention of talented leaders in the Army. This paper will also propose the development of regional skills across the leadership development domains to develop the competence required to operate in support of a regionally aligned theater security cooperation strategy. Integral to this is the development of language skills as part of the commissioning process, and also The toxic behaviors identified in the survey include micromanaging, being meanspirited/aggressive, displaying rigidity and poor decision making, and having a poor attitude and setting a bad example. 19 In his critical review of U.S. Army generalship following World War II, Thomas Ricks describes the inverse relationship between trust and micromanagement, and explains how a lack of trust has corrosive effects within organizations, "slowing them down and cramping their ability to move information quickly, adjust to new circumstances, or engage in prudent risk taking." 20 The intent of the mission command philosophy is to create the opposite command climate, one in which exercising disciplined initiative and taking prudent risk are foundational doctrinal principles. This command climate emphasizes the importance of the unit and the mission, not the individual leader. Toxic leaders focus on self promotion at the expense of their subordinates, usually without considering long-term ramifications to their subordinates, their unit, and the Army profession. 21 The resulting technical report from this recent Center for Army Leadership (CAL) survey identified that erosion of trust was a significant outcome of toxic leadership.
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As discussed previously, perhaps the most damaging result of toxic leadership is that it produces a self-perpetuating cycle that leads to a culture of toxicity. Research conducted on corporate leadership indicates that toxic leaders emerge because they were mentored by toxic leaders themselves. Poor leaders operate under a faulty definition of leadership and develop toxic subordinates over time. 23 The 2010 CASAL survey clearly supports this observation. The survey indicated that toxic leaders accomplish their goals to a greater extent than constructive leaders, and half of the subordinates of toxic leaders expect that leader to achieve a higher level of responsibility. 18% of the respondents that identified serving with toxic leaders said that they emulate that leader. 24 Toxic leaders generally behave in accordance with the goals, tasks, mission and strategies of the organization, and may actually increase subordinate and unit performance through their harsh methods. Promotion decisions are often based on the leader obtaining results, without regard for the negative leadership climate such a leader engenders. Therefore, the toxic leader continues to advance, and is in a position to negatively affect more individuals. 25 Toxic leaders focus on short-term mission accomplishment, and provide their superiors with "impressive, Chairman is to instill mission command into the joint force through doctrine, education, training, and manpower and personnel processes; to institutionalize and operationalize mission command into all aspects of the joint force, "to be imprinted into the DNA of the profession of arms". 27 The Chairman recognizes that a significant cultural change and a comprehensive developmental approach are required to instill the doctrine of mission 12 command into the force. However, a survey of division commanders in 2004 determined that toxic leadership is rooted in personality and not amenable to change, and that the primary challenge is to identify toxic leaders and ensure that such leaders receive an appropriate evaluation that prevents their advancement. The survey also determined that developmental measures will only adequately affect junior officers. 28 Therefore, a developmental approach alone will not affect this cultural change, and toxic leaders will continue to exist and undermine mission command without additional measures.
Personnel Systems Approach
Instilling mission command and a corresponding climate of trust requires a personnel systems approach that clearly identifies and penalizes toxic leaders and incentivizes the alternative. The 2011 Profession of Arms campaign senior leaders survey revealed that only 27% of the respondents thought that the Army is effective at identifying ineffective or negative leaders, and only 17% thought the Army was effective in rehabilitating or removing such leaders. 29 In order to instill mission command into the officer corps the U.S. Army must acknowledge the presence and detriment of toxic leadership, and take immediate, concrete action to reform the current personnel system to allow for subordinate input into the evaluation and board system. 30 The U.S. Army currently employs a number of programs such as the MSAF 360
program and command climate surveys that provide leaders with a comprehensive leadership assessment from subordinates, peers, and superiors. The Army uses these programs as self-development tools, and the results are confidential. Since the reviews are voluntary and confidential, they "have minimal impact in ridding the Army of toxic 13 leaders, but…help the good leaders get better." 31 It is unlikely that a toxic leader would even use such a program unless compelled to by regulation or a superior.
Therefore, this discussion proposes the integration of subordinate input into the evaluation process using a 360 degree assessment tool. At a minimum, commanders at every level should undergo a 360 degree assessment to coincide with evaluation periods. The evaluation process should require the raters and senior raters of commanders to review the results of these surveys, and comment on the results of this review as part of their narrative in the Officer Evaluation Report (OER). The board process for promotion, command, and senior service college selection should also include a review of these survey results to coincide with the remainder of an officer's file. This would allow the evaluation board to take into account subordinate input from the source, in addition to the comments in the OERs. The inclusion of the surveys in this process provides the board with the ability to honestly and holistically assess the officer. The goal is to establish an accurate and consistent assessment with input from subordinates that focuses beyond what the rated officer accomplishes in the short-term, and recognizes the constructive leadership the rated officer establishes as a long term investment in the Army. 32 This personnel systems approach incentivizes mission command, and unmasks the toxic leaders who prevent positive change and inhibit a climate of trust. It allows the chain of command and promotion boards to get an honest, transparent perspective of rated officers, and make informed decisions.
Training Reform to Enable Mission Command
The Army must also reform training management to create a climate of trust that supports the commander's role in mission command and enables the development of a partnering culture. As discussed previously with the example of Gylippus, trust and confidence are derived from competence. As a leadership philosophy and doctrinal precept, mission command demands a very high level of competence from Soldiers, units, and especially commanders. It requires smaller units to conduct decentralized operations with leaders empowered to take action within the commander's intent to develop the situation and rapidly exploit opportunities. 33 The Army's transition to mission command occurs simultaneously with a policy of strategic engagement, which requires smaller units to deploy around the world to advise, train, and partner with armies from other countries in support of contingencies or to help shape the security environment to achieve a strategic effect. Mission command also requires commanders and their units to build teams and earn the trust of unified actions partners which are those military forces, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with which Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. 34 Doctrinally, this requires every soldier to be prepared to assume responsibility, maintain unity of effort, take prudent action, and act resourcefully within the commander's intent. 35 The unifying force providing synergy to these disparate elements is the commander's intent, and the commander is the central figure in mission command. 36 Therefore, the entire leadership philosophy of mission command is primarily dependent on the competence of commanders.
Mission command is also dependent on the ability of the Army to empower commanders to develop competence and trust within their units. In mission command the commander must understand the problem, envision the end state, visualize the operational approach, and then develop his intent. 37 The commander must have the 15 knowledge, experience, and skills to develop intent that is properly aligned with the problem, and then clearly translate his intent to his subordinates. All of this requires the commander to have an intimate knowledge of his unit's strengths and weaknesses, and the capabilities of his subordinate leaders. The commander structures the operation and assigns subordinates their missions based on his knowledge of these capabilities. To accomplish this imperative, General Cone asserts that "mission command applies in training just as it does in operations." 42 In this construct, higher commanders must provide intent, priorities, and resources, and then allow subordinate commanders to craft training within that intent.
Mission command requires commanders to develop trust in their subordinate leaders' ability to train within intent. To achieve this level of trust, commanders must place emphasis on developing junior leader competence in training management. The alignment of training management with mission command allows commanders to set priorities and focus training to achieve a true level of proficiency.
Competence is based on proficiency, and competence is the basis of trust and confidence both internally and externally. This is a critical distinction that goes beyond "training to standard" on a specific task or set of tasks. A soldier or unit may train to standard on hundreds of tasks over a period of time, but at some point that knowledge and skill will begin to atrophy and disappear unless specific tasks are retrained. This is through instruction, experience, and repetitive practice on those critical tasks. 47 Picking the right fundamental skills through this process is the responsibility of the commander who has the essential vision, focus, and understanding to create the correct balance to prevent task saturation, and ensure proficiency. 48 Instilling mission command also requires training leaders and units to function with skill and confidence within the context of the distributed, chaotic, and uncertain nature of the expected operational environment. 49 Such training must develop the skills of the commander to exercise mission command, and this is a key distinction that General Dempsey describes in his mission command white paper. Training scenarios 20 must require commanders, supported by their staffs, to receive and clearly articulate intent, and place commanders in situations with a limited window of opportunity. The purpose is to train leaders to recognize opportunity, and develop skills for rapid decision making to take the initiative and exploit those opportunities. 50 Training for mission command should help commanders develop intuitive judgment by compelling them to make rapid decisions without perfect or complete information, or with too much information. Modern command and control (C 2 ) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems provide commanders and staffs with more information and data than ever before in the history of warfare. Commanders must learn how to avoid information overload and the "paralysis by analysis" that comes from attempting to apply rigid, time-consuming decision making cycles when a rapid decision is appropriate. Training for mission command focuses on developing commanders that are comfortable with uncertainty and the chaos of battle, and have the moral courage to trust their own judgment to decide quickly and act decisively. 51 The collateral benefit of such training is the trust, confidence, and competence that ultimately allow mission command to flourish. Therefore, military leadership is unique because the armed forces must grow and cultivate their leaders from the lowest to the highest levels. 55 The success of mission command is dependent on the talent of its commanders to train subordinate leaders.
Therefore, the U.S. Army must implement a leadership development strategy that instills mission command and fosters talent.
The Army strives to ensure that its leaders are immersed in a learning Closely related to leadership development is the concept of talent management.
Talent is a special natural ability or capacity for achievement that is the intersection of three dimensions: skills, knowledge, and behaviors. These dimensions create an optimal level of individual performance, provided that the individual is employed within their talent. 58 Each person's talent set represents a unique distribution of skills, knowledge, and behaviors, and each organization has a unique distribution of individuals. Achieving optimal organizational performance entails developing, retaining, and employing talent efficiently. 59 Therefore, optimal performance through a talent management system creates the professional competency and the corresponding trust that are so vital to mission command.
A 2006 RAND Corporation study titled "Leader Development in Army Units:
Views from the Field" determined that experiential learning derived from exposure to a variety of assignments and leaders in the operational domain was the most significant contribution to the development of Army leaders. 60 Furthermore, the results of the study indicated that the Army Captains and Majors surveyed ranked actual experience, role models, and exposure to leaders as the three most significant leadership development activities. 61 Additionally, the study identified that the battalion level commander had the greatest influence on the leader development of junior officers. Battalion commanders had the greatest impact on the quality, quantity, and focus of leader development activities. RAND posits these results are significant, as these unit commanders affect leader development as role models, mentors, and counselors, and the study identified widespread perception among junior officers surveyed that the quality of this personal interaction varied greatly depending on the unit commanders' personalities and their capacities to develop leaders. 62 The 2010 CASAL survey that identified the prevalence of toxic leadership also identified significant negative perceptions in the force about the quality and quantity of 26 leader development. In this survey only 30% of the respondents reported that Army leaders in their unit/organization developed the leadership skills of their subordinates to a large or great extent. Additionally, 43% of Army leaders did not believe that they had sufficient time to carry out the duties and responsibilities for developing their subordinates. Furthermore, only 40% of leaders indicated that their unit's leader development has had an impact on their development. 63 The reported statistics indicate a serious contradiction for an institution that must grow its own leaders, and signifies that many senior leaders are not fulfilling their professional obligation within the domain considered the most vital to the development of Army leaders. Lastly, this perception reinforces that there is a significant lack of trust between commanders and subordinate Soldiers and leaders, and calls into question the capacity of senior commanders to abide by the principles of mission command.
As evidenced by the RAND study, the battalion commander is the central individual responsible for organizational leader development. The quality and quantity of that development is directly correlated to the talent of battalion level commanders.
The battalion commander is also the first centrally selected commander in the chain of command, and this population of senior leaders forms the pool of officers from which the Army promotes its Colonels and General Officers, and from which subsequent levels of command are selected. Therefore, it is vital to the leadership quality of the Army to select officers with the talent for command in the battalion command board process. This paper proposes that command boards do not have the correct data from which to make a determination of the qualities of officers for mission command in the same way that they do not have the ability to determine the proclivity of an officer for provides the foundation for inspiring talent leaders to continue to serve in the Army; the opposite will deflect talent, and undermine mission command. Furthermore, the Army should decentralize retention incentives such as graduate school, assignment preference, and broadening opportunities, and give commanders direct access to employ those incentives to retain the most talented leaders. 65 Empowering commanders with these incentives reinforces mission command. By selecting officers with a talent for command, the Army promotes the retention of the most talented leaders that is so critical to an institution that must grow its own leaders. Therefore, the decisive 29 point for an Army talent management system to instill a climate of trust and reinforce mission command is the command selection process.
Focusing on a process that selects officers with a talent for command also allows the Army to create a merit-based system that generates a climate of trust. Integrating the MSAF 360 assessment into the board process for promotion and command cultivates a climate of trust by selecting officers on the basis of a contextual analysis of merit. The current system focuses purely on a top down perspective, which is not necessarily an accurate portrayal of an officer's leadership ability. A talent management system that takes into account an officer's relationship with subordinates and peers in addition to that of the rater and senior rater provides a much more accurate, holistic perspective of merit. Additionally, this holistic approach provides the potential to prevent the inherent favoritism that derives from a purely top down evaluation outlook.
Ultimately, applying a MSAF 360 degree assessment as a tool to inform the selection of the very best officers for command instills integrity into the Army's talent management system, and creates a culture that allows mission command to thrive and prosper.
Leadership in the Modern JIIM Environment
To improve the ability to prevent, shape, and win, the Army plans to align forces regionally in support of combatant command requirements. This conception nests with the strategic guidance from the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Strategy, and will require soldiers and leaders assigned to regional missions to understand languages, culture, geography, and the militaries of the countries where they are likely to be employed. 66 Within the context of mission command, this will require competent commanders and leaders with regional based skills that are not currently established within the leadership development domains.
This paper proposes that the Army establish a comprehensive training and education continuum to develop the competence required to operate in support of a regionally aligned theater security cooperation strategy. The integral requirement for establishing a partnering culture within the leadership development domain is foreign language proficiency. The Army must make a prescribed level of language proficiency a pre-commissioning requirement, and strive to assign officers on the basis of their language skills to the appropriate regionally aligned units. Furthermore, the Army should incentivize this skill set by funding culturally broadening opportunities for cadets designed to enhance their language and cultural skills. This could include a cadet exchange program with foreign militaries during summer training, or a semester of study abroad. These measures will preclude additional language training upon commissioning, and infuse leaders into the force who can make an immediate positive increment to the capability of regionally aligned units. Additionally, the language skill set should become a component of the talent management system, and provide an additional talent dimension for future assignment consideration or broadening opportunities.
As a component of the institutional leadership development domain, the Army should establish a language and cultural training system to coincide with officer transitions between regionally aligned units, or in conjunction with assignments abroad.
As officers transition to a unit aligned with a different region, they will require additional language training as well. This will require a multi-faceted language training capability should serve subsequently with a corresponding regionally aligned unit. Expanding JIIM service would provide the officer corps with critical insight into the capabilities of foreign armies and inter-agency partners, and greatly facilitate the ability of regionally aligned units to prevent and shape through engagement, capacity building, and other advice and assist functions. Equipped with the enhanced regional knowledge and focus from embedded service, the Army will also enable the joint force to win when necessary.
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In addition to the current emphasis on theater security cooperation, rapid population growth and increased urbanization over the next fifteen years will provide impetus for the regional skills sets that enable population centric operations. The population of the world is expected to grow from 7.1 billion people today to close to 8.3 billion people by 2030. 68 This growth in population will cause a corresponding increase in urbanization, with 60% of the world's population expected to reside in urbanized areas over the next 15 years. 69 The rise in population and urbanization will require Unified Land Operations in a population-centric context. Future conflicts are much more likely to be fought "among the people" than "around the people." 70 The recognition of this eventuality led to the development of the concept of human domain by The Army
Special Operations Capabilities Integration Center, which describes human domain as the totality of the physical, cultural, and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that success of any military operation or campaign depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to fight and win population centric conflicts. 71 The Army must develop these unique capabilities across the leadership development domains to generate regionally competent officers that are capable of both theater security cooperation requirements, and future requirement for operations in the human domain.
Therefore, the increased emphasis on theater security cooperation and the proliferation of operations in the human domain underscores the importance of interagency and multi-national service as a component of leader development. This service will provide officers with the understanding that General Dempsey identifies as one of the key attributes for mission command. Understanding equips commanders at all levels with the insight and foresight required to make effective decisions, identify and manage associated risks, and to consider second and subsequent order effects. is the most effective way to provide officers with the concrete experience that will not only translate into understanding and intent, but also create mutual trust. General
Dempsey describes trust as the moral sinew that binds the distributed joint force together, and states that "building trust with subordinates and partners may be the most important action a commander will perform." 74 Therefore, the Army should take the initiative to make inter-agency and multi-national service a priority, particularly for those officers who have a talent for command.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper proposes a series of recommendations to create a climate of trust in the U.S. Army to enable mission command and a partnering culture.
To establish such a climate, the Army must employ measures to identify and remove obstacles to trust, and create the conditions for developing uniquely competent units and leaders. The philosophy of mission command is vital to the development of Joint
Force 2020, and provides the Army with a leadership framework that is relevant to the current transition from the wars of the last twelve years to a resource constrained environment that increasingly depends on the talent of its leaders. The Army must also instill mission command into its leadership culture to remain strategically pertinent.
Attaining the objectives of the nation's security strategy demands the Army invest in leaders and units that can integrate with and develop the capacity of allies and partners around the world to resolve strategic challenges and create opportunities. This is the legacy and example of Gylippus the Spartan, who despite a dearth of his own forces and wealth, was able to arrive upon the shores of Sicily and inspire and lead his allies to achieve a strategic victory. Ibid., 427.
